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cases heretofore cited, which compels a holding that such 
waiver occurs as a matter of law where, as in this case, there 
is a sufficient showing that there was no intent to waive the 
right or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in which the 
action is commenced, and the defendant has acted in good 
faith and with diligence. To blind one's self to the realities 
by a slavish adherence to technicalities is not consonant with 
justice or the liberal tendencies with respect to rules of pro-
cedure and practice. To give the construction to section 396b 
contended for by plaintiffs would be unreasonable and out 
of line with the rules pertaining to waiver. Furthermore, it 
would require a strict and literal, rather than a liberal inter-
pretation of that section. 
The right of the defendant to have certain actions tried 
in the county of his residence "is an ancient and valuable 
right, which has always been safeguarded by statute and is 
supported by a long line of judicial decisions. 'The right of 
a plaintiff to have an action tried in another county than 
that in which the defendant has his residence is exceptional, 
ltnd, if the plaintiff would claim such right, he must bring 
himself within the terms of the eXCleption.' (Brady v. Times-
Mirror Co., 106 Cal. 56 [39 Pac. 209].)" (Brown v. Happy 
Valley Fruit Growers, 206 Cal. 515, 522 [274 Pac. 977].) 
The facts of this case clearly present a situation in which it 
should be said that defendant Bowell has not waived that 
right as was found by the trial court. His residence being 
near the city and county of San Francisco there was no rea-
son for him to insist on a trial in San Mateo County. He did 
not at any time consent that the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County should retain the right. to try the action. When his 
co-pefendant Dooley demanded a transfer to the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, he naturally 
a,greed that that court could try the case; it was not equivalent 
to his consent that the case be tried in the Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs then, without prior notice to 
defendants· of their intention. to do so, dismissed the action 
as to defendant Dooley. The reason: therefore may reason-
ably be said to have been to prevent the transfer of the case 
from Los Angeles. Defendant Bowell was then placed in a 
position, where he had to make his motion for a transfer if 
he wished to preserve his right. He acted promptly, a week 
after tIre dismissal,aud filed an amended demurrer at the 
same tin;te. As far, as ~ppears, the demurrer had not been 
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submitted to the court for decision nor ruled upon when he 
filed his motion for a transfer. Plaintiffs have sUffered no 
prejudice. 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J.,Shenk, J:, Curtis, J., and Traynor, J." con~ 
curred. 
[S.F. No. 16529: In Bank. July 23, 1942.J 
ALICE SPEOKet al., Respondents, v. PHILIPR. SARVER 
et aI., ApP!'lllants .. 
[1] Automobiles-Actions-Appeal-Oonclusiveness of Verdict-
Opntributory NegUgence.-!D.an action arising out, of a head-
,. on collision on a winding highway in. which there was c,6n-
fiicting testimony as to whether plaintiffs w~' traveling on 
their proper side of the roadway ~t a 'slow rate of speed, .an 
implied finding of freedom from contributory 'neglig~nce' is 
conclusive on appeal. , .." 
[2] Negligence-InstructIons-Contributory Negligence-:.Presump-
tion.-In a negligence action, an instruction as to the pre-
. sumption of 'plaitttiff's';freedom from contributory negligence 
,: should not be given where histestimon:v disaloses the acts 
and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at ' 
.the. time in question, there being in such case, no room for any 
pre~umption. ' 
[~] Id.---Review-,--:a:armless and· Reversible Error-Instructions-
'.' Contributory Negiigence.-In a negligence action, an instruc-
tion as to ~4e presumption of plaintiff's fre~dom from con-
tributory negligencl), erroneously given, is not prejudicial to 
" the 'aefeIi.d~nt 'where there is, testimony on both sides on the 
question of contri~utory negligence and anipl~evidence to 
sustain- the finding of the ahsence of such negligence, where' 
the instrUction'itself is qualified by the phrase ·"hi. tbeabsence 
of evidence tOithe contrary," and 'where, moreover, the jury' 
.', iilfully instruc.ted on the. subject of contributory negligence. 
[4] Appeal-Harmless ,and Reversible Error-Oonduct of· Oounsel 
--Our!!, by InstrllOtion.-In a negligence action, any miscon-
~*]. ~resumption'as'evidence, nQ~e, 95 A. L. R. 878. See,; also, 
1QOa1.Jut.-744; 20 Am. Jur. 170. ' , '.' 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 371 (2); '[2] Negli~' 
g~n~e, §209; [3] Negligence, § 246; [4] Appeal and Error, §l538; 
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duct of plaintiffs' counsel in implying that the defendants' 
counsel withheld photographs of the scene of the accident 
could not be said to have been prejudicial where the jury 
were admonished to disregard the statements. 
Id.-Harmless and Reversible Error - Evidence - Insurance 
Against Loss.-In a negligence action, plaintiff's statement 
on the witness stand that the defendant stated he was in-
sured did not constitute prejudicial misconduct where the 
statement was made incidentally during testimony as to a 
conversation tending to show an admission of fault, and 
where it was not made in response to any question attempting 
to inject the fact of insurance into the case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries arising out of an automo-
bile collision. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Francis N. Foley for Appellants. 
Norman S. Menifee for Respondents. 
CURTIS, J.-Defendants appeal from a jUdgment in favor 
of plaintiffs for damages for injuries arising out of an auto-
mobile eollision. 
The two automobiles involved approached from opposite 
directions on a narrow, winding highway and met in a head-
on collision on a curve in the road. There was no white line 
marking the middle of the highway. A bank extended upward 
on the east or defendants' side of the road, and there was a 
steep slope extending downward on the west or plaintiffs' side 
of the road. The plaintiffs testified that the defendants' auto-
mobile was on the wrong side of the road and traveling at an 
excessive rate of speed immediately preceding the collision, 
while plaintiffs' automobile was on the proper side of the 
road and traveling at a slow rate of speed. Plaintiff Matthew 
Speck, the driver of the car, testified that just prior to the 
impact he swerved slightly toward the center of the road to 
avoid going over the bank. The tlefendant driver also turned 
in and the automobiles came to rest approximately in the cen-
ter of the road. Philip Sarver, the driver of the defendants' 
car, testified that at all times he was driving on the proper 
side of the r:oad at a moderate speed, while just before the 
July 1942J SPECK V. SARVER 
[20 c. (2d) 585] 
587 
collision plaintiff Speck. was driving on the wrong side of the 
road. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, 
a motion for a new trial was made by the defendants and de-
nied by the trial court. 
[1] Upon this appeal it is urged that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to support the implied finding of the jury ~hat the 
plaintiffs were free from negligence. In other words, it is 
contended that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. It is also urged that the court erred 
in giving a certain instruction to the jury; and that there 
was prejudicial misconduct on the part of plaintiffs' attorney 
preventing defendants from having a fair triaL 
There is no necessity for a detailed discussion of appel-
lants' first contention. From the brief recital of the facts 
herein and from the other evidence disclosed by the record, 
it is apparent that the jury was justified in making its im-
plied finding that the plaintiffs were free from contributory 
negligence. The evidence is conflicting on this issue and the 
jury's implied finding thereon is conclusive on appeal. (Tay-
lor v .. Oakland Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. (2d) 594 [110 P. (2d) 
1044]; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374 [268 Pac. 369]; 
.. ~ Smith v. Rothschild, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 273 [39 P. (2d) 464] ; 
Wynne v. Wright, 105 Cal. App. 17 [286 Pac. 1057].) 
[2] The instruction complained of is as follows: "In the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that 
the plaintiffs did everything that reasonably prudent per-
gons would have done under the circumstances for the pro-
tection of their safety. The presumption that plaintiffs were 
llot guilty of contributory riegligence is, in itself, .a species 
of evidence which continues with the said plaintiffs through-
out the trial of this action and unless and until overcome by 
evidence to the contrary. This presumption in favor of said 
plaintiffs must ~revail until and unless it is overCome by sat-
igfactory evidence to the contrary." 
'rho rebuttable presumption that a person takes ordinary 
care of his own concerns is declared in section 1963(4) of the 
Codc of Civil Pro('cduJ'c . .An instruction as to the existence of 
this presumption may properly be given to the jury in cer-
tain situations. (See Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal. (2d) 360 
[94 P. (2d) 590] ; Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal. 
(2d) 355 [84 P. (2d) 510] ; Downing v. Southern Pacific Co., 
15 Cal. App. (2<1) 246 [59 P. (2d) 578].) Such an instruc-
tion, however, should not be given where the evidence intro-
,~-------------------------------
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. dw~ed by the plaintiff disdoses the acts and conduct of the 
injured party immediately prior to or at the time in question. 
(See cases last cited and also Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal. (2d) 
294 [65 P;(2d) 65]; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.. (2d) 111 
[47 P.(2d) 709]; Rogersv. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 
36 [297 Pac. 884].) In the instant case the plaintiffs testified 
. in regard to the events leaditig up to the collision. Plaintiff 
Matthew Speck, the driver, explained all of his actions. Un-
der such circumstances there was no room for the presump-
tionin this case. What was said in Rogers v. Interstate Tran-
sit Co., supra, is equally applicable here. It is there stated at 
page 38: "At the trial of this action plaintiff not only testified 
as to the circumstances of the collision between .the car he 
was driving and the .autostage of the defendant, but he pro-
duced witnesses who gave evidence, both direct and on cross-
examination, of his acts and conduct just before and at the 
time of the collision. Whether the plaintiff took ordinary 
care of his own concerns while operating his car at that par-
ticularoccasion was a matter of evidence established by the 
plaintiff and wit:riesses called by him in support of his daim 
that he did. In the face of this evidence there was no' room 
for any presumption. If the evidence on his part showed that 
he was negligent, then it cannot be saId that the jury, not-
withstanding this evidence, might presume that he was not 
negligent~ or that he took ordinary care of his own concerns, 
which amounts to the same thing. On the other hand, if this 
evidence showed that plaintiff was not negligent in the opera-
tion of his car at the time of its collision with defendant's 
stage, then that fact was before the jury, not as the result of 
any presumption, but in response to testimony of witnesses 
testifying in the case. In either event, the jury, in determin-
ingwhether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, would look 
to and be governed by the evidence·before the court, and not 
by any presumption." In view of the foregoing, the giving of 
the instruction complained of was error. 
[3] The question still remains whether the instruction was 
prejudicial under all the circumstances of this case. We are 
satisfied that it was not. There was considerable testimony 
on both sides on the question of contributory negligence, and, 
as previously stated, there was ample evidence to support the 
jury's implied finding that the plaintiffs were not negligent. 
The instruction itself was qualified by the phrase "in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary," Under it the jury was 
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therefore free to accept the contrary evidence and· to r~turn: 
a verdict thereon in favor of the defendants. Contributory 
negligence was fully and properly defined by the court,~and 
the jury was instructed: "If you find from the evidence that 
plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as defined in 
this instruction, however slight such contributoIjhegligence 
on their part may have been, then you should return your 
verdict for the defendants, and each of them." The jury 
was further. instructed: "Plaintiffs were at all times· called 
upon to exercise ordinary care for their own safety and,if 
they failed to do so, and such failure was a proximate. cause 
of injury or damage to them, they cannot recover and" your 
verdict must be against· them and in favor of defendant's." 
The jury was also told: "Whether the parties did, or" did not, 
use ordinary care is for you to determine from the facts tes-
tified to and, if you condude from the evidence that plain-. 
tiffs did not use ordinary care and that their lack of ordinary 
care contributed proximately to their .injury or damage then 
your verdict must be against the plaintiffs and in favor of 
defendants." In consideration of the qualification in the in-
struction itself and in view of the other instructions quoted 
0;" above, the defendants did not stiffer any prejudice by the 
giving of the instruction. Under such circumstances the error 
is not prejudicial and does not warrant a reversal. [Ca1ifor~ 
nia Constitution, article VI, § 4lh j Ellison v. Lang Transpor-
tation Co., supra; Tuttle v. Crawford, 8 Cal. (2d) 126 [63 :P. 
(2d) 1128]; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., supra.] 
[4] Any asserted misconduct on the part of plaintiffs' 
counsel in implying that defendants' counsel was withhold-
ing photographs of the scene of the accident may not be said 
to have been prejudicial. The trial judge admonished the jury 
to disregard the statements. (Keenav. United Ra~'lroads, 197 
Cal. 1481 163 [239 Pac. 1061]; House v. Pacific Greyhound 
Lines, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 336, 342 [95 P~ (2d) 465] ; Gerber-
ich v. Southern California Edison Co., 26 Cal. App.(2d) 471, 
476 [79 P. (2d) 783].) [5] Nor did plaintiff Matthew Speck's 
statement. on the witness stand that defendant Philip Sarver 
had stated he was insured constitute prejudicial misconduct 
under the facts of this case. Speck's statement was made inci" 
dentally during testimony as to a conversation which oc~ 
curred between him and Sarver in which Sarver tended to 
admit. fault. The statement was not made in response to any 
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dants' insurance into the case. The proper rule governing the 
reference to insurance in the instant case is found in Packard 
v. Moore, 9 Cal. (2d) 571,580 [71 P. (2d) 922], wherein this 
court adopts the following statement from Hughs v. Quacken-
bush, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 349 [37 P. (2d) 99]: "While the 
courts have condemned repeatedly attempts to bring before 
the jury the fact that insurance exists, their condemnation 
extends only to cases where there is an 'avowcd purpose and 
successful attempt' to bring the fact beforE: the jury. It does 
not extend to cases where the information comes'in, incident-
ally, in attempting to prove other facts, or where the record 
does not show that the particular answer was sought or anti-
cipated." (See, also, Hatfield v. Lcvy Brothers, 18 Cal. (2d) 
798 [117 P. (2d) 841].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurring. 
GIBSON, C. J. -- I concur for the reason thnt the rules IlB 
to the nature of rebuttable presumptions upon which the fore-
going opinion is b8,sed have been fixed by many decisions of 
this court, and any modification of such rules should be ef-
fected by the Legislature, and not by overruling at this time 
the cases establishing them. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent .. 
After properly instructing the jury that the defendants 
ha.d the burden of proving the plaintiffs guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, the court proceeded to instruct them that 
there was a presumption against the existence of facts it, was 
defendant's burden to prove, and that this presumption coUld 
be weighed as evidence of their non-existence. This instruc-
tion was prejudicial error, for it enabled the jury to tilt the 
scales against the defendant by arbitrarily attributing more 
weight to the presumption than to the evidence against it, 
no matter how extensive or persuasive. Evidence is mar' 
shalled to no avail against a presumption under such an in-
struction, for it is impossible to prove the non-existence of 
the fact presumed when the jury is free to regard the pre-
sllmption as superior to any proof against it. So long as the 
presumption is regarded as superior it iq inviolate, and the 
most exhaustive proof cannot disturb its invulnerability. The 
rule that rebuttable' presumptions may be weighed as evi-
July 1942] SPECK V. SARVER 
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dence is so arbitrary, and its consequences so mischievous 
that it becomes imperative to set forth to what lengths it has 
departed from the function and purposes of such presump-
tions. 
When one of the parties to a lawsuit has the burden of 
proof upon a particular issue, he must establish the existence 
of the necessary facts by preponderance of the evidence, per-
suade the jury that it is more probable that these facts exist 
than that they do not. (Code Civ. Proc. §§2061 (5),1826,1981 j 
Murphy v. Waterhouse, 113 Cal. 467 [45 Pac. 866, 54 'Am. 
St. Rep. 365] jErgo v. Merced Falls etc. 00., 161 Cal. 334 
[119 Pac. 101, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79] j Treadwell v. Nickel, 
194 Cal. 2·13 [228 Pac. 25].) In a civil suit the. burden of 
proof is the maximum requirement that can be placed upon 
a party who undertakes to prove the existence of facts. In 
some instances the courts and legislatures have found it neces~ 
sary to lend assistance to the party bearing the burden of 
proof. In certain types of C8.$es they have set up rules, desig-
nated &i rebuttable presumptions, to the effect that when such 
a party establishes the existence of certain primary facts, the 
additional facts necessary to prove his ease will be presumed 
4~ to exist, unless the opposing party offers proof that they do 
. not exist, in which case the jury must determine the existence 
or non-exh;tence of these facts from the evidence. Rebuttable 
presumptions do not shift the ultimate burden of proof, but 
impose upon the party without the burden of proof the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence after his opponent 
has introduced evidence sufficient to establish the existence of 
certain primary faets. (Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.] §§ 2487, 
2489, 2491; Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 
314-315, 317. Sue Scott v. Wood, 81 Cal. 398 [22 Pac. 871] ; 
San Francisco v. Tillman Estate 00., 205 Cal. 651 [272. Pac. 
585].) They are employed for various reasons (See Morgan, 
Instrtwting the Jury on PreS1tmptions and Burden of Proof. 
47 Harv. L. Rev. 59, 77; American Law Institute, Code of 
Evidence Tentative Draft No.2, (1941) p. 211): (1) To re-
quire the litigant v:ith greater access to the factS in dispute 
to make them ~own. Thus, if a plaintiff bailor, with the bur-
den of proof, establishes that he delivered property in good 
condition to a defendant bailee and received it back in a dam-
aged condition, a presumption arises that it was damaged be-' 
cause of the bailee's negligence, and the latter must then come 
forward with proof that his negligence did not cause the in-
,I· 
'I' . , " . 
it ' 
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jury. (Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. 00., 60 
F. (2d) 734; Rustad v. G1'eatNorthern R. R. 00., 122 Minn. 
453 [142 N. W. 727].) (2) To assist in solving a dilemma 
when there is little or no evidence available to prove or dis-
prove a particular fact. Thus, if a person has been continu-
ously absent and unheard from for seven years, he will be pre-
sumed dead in the absence of evidence to the contrary, so as 
to enable a court to distribute his estate. (Code Civ. Proc. 
§1963(26).) (3) To facilitate a finding in accord with the 
balance of probability. Thus, it is presumed in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary that a person found to have met his 
death by violence did not commit suicide. (Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 1963(1); see Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Oorp., 190 Cal. 
1 [210 Pac. 269] ; 95 A. L. R. 887.) (4) To encourage a find-
ing consonant with judicial judgment as to sound social pol-
icy. Thus, it is usually presumed in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary that a marriage has been lawfully contracted. 
(Code Civ. Proc. § 1963 (30) .) 
Rebuttable presumptions are thus no more than procedural 
devices for the fair apportionment between the litigants of 
the burden of going forward with the evidence. If the party 
against whom a' presumption operates fails to come forward 
with substantial evidence tending to prove the non-existence 
of the facts presumed, his Opponent with the burden of proof 
is entitled to an instruction that the facts exist. If he does 
come forward with such evidence, the jury must decide upon 
the existence of the facts. (Wigmore, supra, §§ 2487, 2489, 
249i; Thayer, supra, 314-315, 317; 1 Jones, Evidence [2d ed.] 
54.) 
In the majority of jurisdictions the presumption disap-
pears from the case when evidence is introduced contrary to 
the facts presumed, and the issue goes to the jury with the 
primary burden of proving the facts still upon the party who 
originally assumed it. (See cases cited in 22 C. J. 156, note 
34; Wigmore, supra, § 2491 ; Jones, S1tpra, § 32.) Some courts, 
however, hold that a presumption continues to operate until 
the party against whom it applies introduces evidence that 
persuades the jury that the non-existence of the facts pre-
sumed is as probable as their existence when considered with 
evidence as to their existence introduced by the litigant in 
whose favor the presumption operates. (O'Dea v. Amodeo, 
118 Conn. 58 [170Atl. 486J ; Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
00., 219 Iowa 24 [257 N. W. 445, 95 A. L. R. 863] ; Clark v. 
-~~""~~ 
.,' 
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Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507 [147 Atl. 33] ; Gillett v. Michigan 
United Traction 00., 205 Mich. 410 [171 N. W. 536] ; Klunk 
v. Hocking Valley Ry. 00., 74 Ohio St. 125 [77 N. E. 752]. 
See Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59; McBaine, Presump-
tions: Are They Evidence? 26 CaL L .. Rev. 519, 533.) If the 
opposing party introduces no substantial evidence to combat 
the presumption, the court will instruct the jury that the 
facts exist as a matter of law. If he introduces such evidence 
the case goes to the jury with instructions that if it disbe-
lieves the evidence of the opposing party, the presumption 
stands and the verdict should be in favor of the party with 
the burden of proof. If, however, the jury believes it dS prob-
able that the facts do not exist as that they do, it should find 
in favor of the party against whom the presumption operates. 
This view of the effect of presumptions is the sounder one. 
Under the majority rule the purpose of a presumption can be 
defeated by perjured testimony that is not believed by the 
trier of the facts; the mere introduction of evidence, however 
unreliable, suffices to dispel the presumption. Under the mi-
nority rule the presumption remains until sufficient contrary 
evidence is introduced that the trier of the facts is willing to 
believe. 
In either case, it is clear that a rebuttable presumption is 
only a procedural device to aid the party with the burden of 
proof. It would be meaningless if applied against him because 
he already has the greater burden of introducing. sufficient 
evidence to prove the existence of the facts by the preponder-
ance of the probabilities. Such presumptions cannot constitute 
actual evidence, as would the observations of witnesSe~ or 
physical objects or occurrences. They are merely rules estab-
lishing the existence of a fact as a matter of law in the ab-
sence of credible evidence to the contrary, and apportioning 
the burden of going forward with the introduction of such 
evidence. The overwhelming majority. of decisions in other 
jurisdictions agree that rebuttable presumptions' cannot be 
evidence, however they may disagree as to when they disap-
pear from the case. (See cases cited in 95 A. L. R. 880.) 
Certain cases in California, however, have held that the 
court should instruct the jury to weigh presumptions as .act-
ual evidence along with the testimony in determining the 
existence of facts, and that preijumptions may be directed 
against the party with the burden of proof. (Smellie v. South-
','; 
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ern PaCific 00. et al., 212 Cal. 540 [299 Pac. 529] ; see cascs 
cited in 18 Cal. L. Rev. 418; 20 Cal. L. Rev. 189. Sec 95 
A. L. R. 883.) It is a mental impossibility to weigh a pre-
sumption as evidence. Juries can decide upon the probable 
existence of a fact only by a consideration of actual proba-
tive evidence bearing thereon. A rule of law that the fact will 
be presumed to exist in the absence of evidence cannot assist 
them in determining from an examination of evidence 
whether ornot the fact exists. It is impossible to weigh a rule 
of law On the one hand against physical objects and personal 
observations on the other to determine which would more 
probably establish the existence or non-existence of a fact. 
The burden of proof may well be impossible for a litigant 
to sustain if a presumption is applied as evidence against him. 
He must, under such a rule, establish the existence of certain 
facts by a preponderance of the probabilities, while a pre-
sumption persists that these facts do not exist and the jury 
is free to weigh this presumption as evidence upon which to 
find that the facts do not exist despite physical evidence that 
they do. 
Even when a presumption treated as evidence is applied 
in favor of the party with the burden of proof, the results are 
incongruous. The other litigant is in effect informed by the 
court that his opponent has the burden of proving the facts 
by the preponderance of the probabilities but there is a pre-
sumption that the facts thus to be proved are true, and the 
jury is free to find on the basis of·this presumption that the 
facts do exist despite physical El'Vidence that they do not. The 
presumption should serve only to force the party without the 
burden of proof to come forward with evidence contrary to 
the facts presumed, not somehow to outweigh the very evi-
dence that he introduces to prove his point. 
The California cases have treated presumptions as evidence 
primarily on the ground that certain code sections compel 
this result. (See McBaine, supra, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, 557-
561.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1961 states : "A pre-
sumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be 
controverted by other evidence; direct or indirect; but .unless 
so controverted the jury are bound to find according to the 
presumption. " Section 1963 lists 40 rebuttable presumptions 
that "may be controverted by other evidence." These sections 
embody the general rule that a rebuttable presumption estab-
lishes the existence of a fact unless credible evidence contrary 
4~ 
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to the fact presumed is presented. They in no way establish 
that the presumption itself is evidence. The references to 
"othcr evidence" serves to distinguish evidence controvert-
ing the presumption from evidence of the primary facts that 
give rise to the presumption and from evidence that may be 
introduced in support of the f!lct presumed. 
Section 2061 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The 
jury, subject to the control of the court, in the cases speci-
fied in this code, are the judges of the effect or value of evi-
dence addressed to them, except when it is declared to be 
conclusive. They are, however, to be instructed by the court 
on all proper occasions: ... (2) That they.are not bound to 
decide in conformity with the declarations of any number of 
witnesses, which do not produce conviction: in' their minds, 
against a less number or against a presumption or other evi-
dence satisfying their minds. " Certainly there is no statement 
here that a presumption must be treated as evidence .. This 
section does no more than establish the,rule that gives to pre-
sumptions greater vitality than they would ha\1e if they' dis-
appeared upon the introduction of any evidence contrary to 
thefacts'presumed. It provides in effect that a rebuttal:!le pre-
sumption remains in the case arid controls the determination 
of a jury that disbelieves the evidEmce contrary to the fact 
prestimed. 
,Finally, section 1957 provides: "Indirect evidence is of 
two kinds: 1. Inferences, and 2. Presumptions." This section 
is a broad classification of indirect evidence and is not con-
cerned with the legal effect of a presumption. At the timeQf 
its adoption in 1872, legal writers used the termspresump-
tions and inferences interchangeably. to apply to a logical de-
duction that could be drawn from a set of facts. (1 'Greenleaf, 
Evidence [Redfield ed.] 21; 1 Phillipps, Evidence, [3ded.] 
436-437; 1 Starkie, Evidence, [3d ed.] 404. See Thayer, supra, 
546-548; Wigmore, supra, § 2491; McBaine, supra, 26 Cal. 
L. Rev. 519, 521-527.) That this meaning of presumption was 
intended by the Legislature when it enacted section 1957 in 
1872 is indicated by section 1832, enacted at the same time, 
which states: "Indirect evidence is that which tends to estab-
lish the fact in dispute by proving another,and which, t,hough 
true, does not of itself conclusively establish that fact, but 
which affords an inference or presumption of its existence. 
For example: a witness proves an admission of the party to 
the fact in dispute. This proves a fact, from which the fact 
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in dispute is inferred." This section defines indirect evidence 
as an inference, but uses the terms "inference" and "pre-
sumption" as synonyms. Section 1957 does not therefore 
establish rebuttable legal presumptions as evidence in view of 
other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which specifi-
cally set forth the effect of legal rebuttable presumptions. 
(Code Civ.· Proc. §§ 1959, 1961, 1963.) A construction ofthese 
sections to the effect that rebuttable presumptions may be 
weighed as evidence would in all likelihood render them un-
constitutional. (Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U. S. 1 [49 
S. Ct. 215, 73 L. Ed. 575] ; Western &- Atlantic R. R. 00. v. 
Henderson, 279 U. S. 639[49 S. Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884]; 
Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 [54 S. Ct. 281, 78 L. Ed. 
664]; New York Life Insur. 00. v. Gamer, 303 U. S. 161 [58 
R Ct. 500, 82 L. Ed. 726, 114 A. L. R. 1218]. See, also, Peo-
ple v. Murguia, 6 Cal. (2d) 190 [57 P. (2d) 115]. See Mc-
Baine, supra, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, 551 note 66 and authorities 
there cited.) 
The rebuttable presumptions enumerated in the codes as 
well as those established by the courts do not require any set 
procedural formula to give them effect. If the litigant against 
whom a presumption operates has the burden of proof, an in-
struction by the court to the jury that such litigant must 
establish the facts by a preponderance of the probabilities im-
poses upon the litigant an even greater burden than that re-
quired by the presumption. No mention of the presumption 
is necessary. If the presumption operates in favor of the party 
with the burden of proof the court should instruct the jury 
that upon the setting up of certain preliminary facts the pre-
sumption applies in favor of the party with the burden of 
proof who is entitled to the verdict unless the other litigant 
comes forward with credible evidence contrary to the facts 
presumed. Once such evidence is produced and believed, the 
jury should weigh it against any evidence introduced in sup-
port of the facts presumed and decide in favor of the party 
against whom the presumption operates if it believes that the 
non-existence of the facts is as probable as their existence. 
Nothing need be said about weighing the presumption as evi-
dence. When the evidence against the presumption is clear, 
positive, uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot 
rationally be ~!:dieved the court should instruct the jury, 
as 1± -;;(Juid regarding inferences, that the non-existence of 
che fact presumed has been established as a matter of law. 
.... 
July 1942) SPECK V. SARVER 
[20 c. (2d) 5851 
597 
(Blank v. Ooffin, 20 Cal. (2d) 457 [126 P. (2d) 868); Eng-
strom v.Aub1trn Auto Sales Oorp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64 [77 P. 
(2d) 1059).) . 
There is no agreement in the California cases on the propO-
sition that rebuttable presumptions should be weighed asevi-
dence. The Smellie case, supra, was preceded by a,line of de-
cisions holding that presumptions were not evidence. (Biddle 
Boggs v. Merced Mining 00., 14 Cal. 279, 375; Nietov. Oar-
penter, 21 Cal. 455, 489; Larrabee v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 
173 Cal. 743, 747 [161 Pac. 750).) The courts have consist-
ently held that the presumption of innocence from crime can-
hot be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding. (People v. 
Moran, 144 Cal. 48 [77 Pac. 777).) The Smellie case held that 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1963 (4), which presumes 
"that a person takes ordinary care {If his own concerns" 
should be weighed by the jury as evidence of absence of con-
tributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. Later cases have 
. limited the application of this presumption to situations 
where there are no eye witnesses to. an accident, holding that 
"where it is possible to call eye witnesses to testify positively. 
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, the 
presumption is not applicable." (Downing v. Southern Paci-
fic 00., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 246 [59 P.(2d) 578]; Rogers v. 
Tl1.terstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 Pac. 884].) Still 
other cases have held that this presumption and similar ones 
in favor of one party are dispelled when the details of the 
accident are disclosed by the testimony of that pa.rty or his 
witnesses. (Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Corp., 190 Cal. 1 
[210 Pac. 2691 ; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal. (2d) 294 [65 P. 
(2d) 65) ; Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. (2d) 356 (65 P. (2d) 
914] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal. (2d) 111 (47 P. (2d) 709).) 
Certain decisions have indicated that the person whose con-
duct is in question must be dead before the presumption can 
operate in this manner. (Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal. (2d) 
360 [94 P. (2d) 590).) In effect these cases hold that the pre-
sumption drops out of the case because there is evidence 
bringing into question the fact presumed. There is in them an 
inarticulated admission that the character of evidence is for-
eign to presumptions, and that however often it has artifid-
ally been grafted on to them it can be shed with equal fa-
cility. Confusion is rife, however, because presumptions have 
not been clearly divested of their artificial character. They 
appear now as themselves and again in the guise of evidence. 
I 
I if 
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The court has sometimes seen through the disguise when the 
injustices it would have concealed revealed themselves imme-
diately and boldly. As often as not, however, the court has 
failed to perceive the injustice through the disguise. It. is 
time to have done with the confusion and inconsistency en-
gendered Ly its vacillation between the acceptance alid the re-
pudiation of presumptions as evidence. 
It is pure ritualism that a precedent should gather as much 
respect from a long life of inconsistency as it would from a 
long life of certainty, and earn the right to survive merely 
be~ause it has survived so long. One looks to preeeuent for 
certainty, the substance of its vitality. If instead it offers 
only confusion it loses its right to endure indefinitely. The 
confusion in the California cases as to the function of rebut-
table presumptions can be eliminated only by repudiating the 
erroneous ,iew that such presumptions may be weighed as 
evidence. Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, and the cases 
following it should be overruled. 
In the field of evidence and procedure everything is gained 
and little lost by overruling an irrational :;>recedcnt. Nothing 
. is taken away, as it might be in the substantive law of prop-
erty and contracts, upon which one is entitleu to rely. Cer-
tainly the parties in an automobile accident cannot reason-
ably· contenu that they operated their vehicles in rclbnce on 
the rule in the Smellie case. That rule was a judgc~mauc rule 
and should be laid at rest where it originnteu. It would be 
most inappropriate to shift the responsibility for its demise 
to the Lceislature, for it involves not questions of policy, Lui 
tecb.nical questions of procedure that arc peculiarly within 
the provincc of the courts. If the court can view with equa-
nimity a legislative repUdiation of the rule, its own adherenco 
to tho rule springs no longer from a conviction of its right-
ness, but from a willing!less to endure its wrongn(>ss until 
others less suited to the task take the initiative in its repuuh-
tion. 
EUlllonds, J., ooncurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 20, 
19..1:2. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., vote-d for a rdlCarinrr. 
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ELETHA R. DILLARD, Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS AN-
GELES (a Municipal Corporation) et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Pensions-Construction of Statutes.-Pension laws should be 
liberally construed and applied to the end that the beneficent 
policy thereby established may be accorded proper recognition. 
[2] Police-Pensions-Contingencies Justifying Pension-Heart 
Attaek.-The fact that a police officer had a previous heart 
affiiction at the time of an injury received in the performanee 
of his duty does not of itself defeat his dependents' rir,ht to 
a pension if the injury precipitated his death by aggravating 
the heart condition. 
[3] Id. - Mandamus - Evidence. - In a mandamus proceeding to 
enforce a right to a pension, the evidenee establishellthe death 
of It policeman from an injury received in the performance of 
his duty where it disclosed .that he received an injury during 
a stru~gle to retain a prisoner in custody, that he was sent home 
while in no condition to operate an automobile, that he con-
sumed liquor during the short iI\terval between the time he was 
0; left at his car and the collision, and that, as testified, the drink-
ing was the natural act of a dying man to bolster his waning 
strenr,th. In such circumstance, it is immaterial whether the 
automobile accident immediately causing death resulted from 
intoxication or a heart attack. 
[4] Death-Presumptions-Negligcnce . ...,...The operator of an auto-
mobile killed in It eollision with a car parked at the curb is pre-
sumed free from negligence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, 
subd.4.) 
[5] Police-Pensions-Contingencies Justifying Pension-Death 
En Route Homo.-The death of a p(lliee officer in an automobile 
accident arose out of and in the course of his employment within 
a charter pension provision where he beeame il: from a heart 
attack as the direct effect of a struggle with a prisoner, where 
before the expiration of his regular period of duty he was 
directed by his superior to return home because of such illness, 
such superior knowing' that his means of transport was by auto-
mobile, and where the accident occurred while he was en route 
home. 
[1] SeC' 20 Cal .. Jur. 997. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pensions, § 3; [2, 5] Police, § 24; 
[3] Police, § 32; [4] Death, § 42. 
